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Approved For Release 1988/09/28 : CIA-RDP85-100875R000300010014

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

28 MARCH 1973

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
**Confidential**



# **TRENDS**

## **in Communist Propaganda**

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


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28 MARCH 1973  
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 13)

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## CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . 1

### INDOCHINA

DRV Questions Future U.S. Intent as Withdrawal Is Completed . . 1  
Dispute on Final POW Release, U.S. Withdrawal Detailed. . . . 3  
DRV, PRG Claim Respect for Accord, Charge Allied Violations . . 5  
USSR Cites Its Support for DRV, PRG at Paris, Attacks Peking. . 6  
Sihanouk Remains Absent from View as FUNK Marks Anniversary . . 7  
Lao Communist Party Documents Carried on Clandestine Circuit. . 12

### SALT

RED STAR Warns that Trident Contradicts Spirit of SALT I. . . . 14

### USSR-IRAQ

Saddam Husayn, Kosygin Hold "Comradely" Talks in Moscow. . . . 16

### CUBA - U.S. - USSR

Moscow Urges U.S. to Normalize Relations with Cuba. . . . . 21

### EUROPE FORCE CUTS

Soviet Bloc Stresses Importance of Equal Security in Talks. . . 24

### CHINA

Leaders Reappear After Period of Absence from View. . . . . 26  
Mass Organizations Rebuild; Shanghai To Form Trade Union. . . . 26

### USSR

Moscow's Purge of Armenian Leadership Gains Momentum. . . . . 28  
Kazakh Oblast Borders Rearranged for Economic Efficiency. . . . 29

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBI'S TRENDS

28 MARCH 1973

- 1 -

## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 19 - 25 MARCH 1973

Moscow (2874 items)

International Peace Forces' Meeting in Moscow	(2%) 9%
Iraq's Saddam Husayn in USSR	(-- ) 7%
Vietnam	(5%) 6%
China	(5%) 6%
GDR Premier Stoph Stop-over in USSR	(-- ) 4%
Czech President Svoboda Reelection	(-- ) 3%

Peking (1198 items)

Domestic Issues	(48%) 48%
Cambodia	(1%) 16%
[FUNK 3d Anniversary	(-- ) 13%]
United Nations Issues	(2%) 14%
[Seabed Meeting	(-- ) 7%]
[SC Meeting in Panama	(2%) 7%]
Vietnam	(5%) 5%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

C O R R E C T I O N: In the 21 March 1973 TRENDS listing of Topics and Events Given Major Attention by Peking radio, the third and fourth topics should read: Romanian Cultural Delegation in PRC (--) 4%  
USSR Economic Failures (--) 4%

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 1 -

## INDOCHINA

Hanoi's concern regarding the U.S. stand in the event that military action is resumed in South Vietnam was dramatically evidenced in an unusually emotional NHAN DAN editorial marking the 28 March deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops. The editorial expressed great bitterness toward the United States and questioned its intent to abide by the Vietnam peace agreement.

Vietnamese communist media had reported in some detail on delays in the final release of U.S. POW's and withdrawal of U.S. troops due to the controversy over the Administration's insistence that prisoners held throughout Indochina be included in the final exchange. The 25 March White House announcement that the President had ordered U.S. forces to remain in Vietnam until all U.S. POW's in Indochina were released had prompted predictable charges from both Hanoi and the PRG that this was merely another pretext to continue U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam. The solution of the deadlock--following the Pathet Lao's 26 March announcement that it would release U.S. prisoners--has been glossed over, with the media claiming, without elaboration, that the U.S. side had been forced to agree to withdraw all its troops by the 29th.

Continued publicity for stepped-up DRV and PRG activity in the international arena includes the announcement that Hanoi will host a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions on 29-30 March. Following official visits to Middle East countries, PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh arrived in Moscow on 26 March for an "official friendship" visit.

## DRV QUESTIONS FUTURE U.S. INTENT AS WITHDRAWAL IS COMPLETED

In expressing deep-felt hostility and suspicion toward the United States, the 28 March NHAN DAN editorial is at sharp variance with Hanoi's earlier expressed desire, at the time the peace agreement was concluded, to seek friendly relations with the United States. As broadcast by Hanoi radio in Vietnamese, the editorial said that "in the past 20 years the U.S. imperialists have committed so many crimes against our people that not only our present generation but all our future generations will hate and resent them." The VNA English-language version of the editorial deleted this passage.

In contrast to this bleak prediction, the 28 January DRV party-government appeal had expressed the DRV's desire to entertain

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 2 -

friendly relations with all countries, including the United States. The 14 February U.S.-DRV communique on Kissinger's visit to Hanoi was even more forthcoming when it echoed Kissinger's 24 January press conference statement advocating the normalization of relations between the two countries. In a National Assembly speech on 20 February, Premier Pham Van Dong paraphrased the peace agreement in declaring that its "strict implementation" would "create conditions for establishing a new, equal, and mutually beneficial relationship" between the DRV and the United States.

Having recorded the bitter feelings of the Vietnamese toward the United States, the 28 March editorial went on atypically to address directly the question of whether the United States will strictly implement the peace agreement by ending its involvement in Vietnam. An editorial on 19 March seemed to pave the way for this question when it said that the United States must choose between resuming its military involvement or seriously implement the agreement and advance toward "new and normal relations" with the DRV. The editorial on the 28th recited the standard litany--including charges of the dispatch of arms to Saigon and strengthening of our bases in Thailand--in accusing the United States of seeking to maintain its military involvement. Viewing such U.S. actions as "props for the Saigon's troops' nibbling operations and terrorist acts," NHAN DAN went beyond the usual warning about potential dangers to peace to raise the question of how the United States would respond to expanded military action:

This is a very dangerous situation, because it can lead to an outbreak and escalation of the war. How will the United States handle the situation if it continues to urge the Saigon troops to continue their attacks, which cannot avoid being punished?

NHAN DAN made it clear that renewed U.S. military involvement is not the only danger. In the standard euphemistic reference to support for Saigon, it said that the U.S. imperialists still plot "to impose their neocolonialist regime on South Vietnam." In answer to its rhetorical question on the meaning of the pledge--in the peace accord--to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam and the South Vietnamese right to self-determination, the paper said: "This means the United States must put a definite end to its involvement and intervention," something the paper claimed the United States has yet to do.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 3 -

## DISPUTE ON FINAL POW RELEASE, U.S. WITHDRAWAL DETAILED

Snags in the final return of U.S. POW's and the withdrawal of U.S. forces were first reported by the Hanoi and PRG radios on 23 March and were subsequently described in detail. According to these reports, the United States on 21 March had agreed--at a central Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting and in a note--to a timetable calling for the final lists of prisoners to be handed over on the 23d and for the return of POW's to take place on the 24th and 25th. During the same period, it was noted, the United States was to "basically complete" the withdrawal of its forces and other foreign allied forces, and the remaining U.S. servicemen in the JMC were to be withdrawn by the end of the 60-day deadline--28 March.

The communists have charged that the agreement of the 21st was suddenly reversed on the following morning, with notes from the U.S. delegation to the JMC annulling the agreement and later demanding that the PRG and DRV also hand over the namelist and release U.S. and foreign POW's captured throughout Indochina. The initial communist reports on the 23d, setting forth the basic arguments, pointed out that the peace accord contained no provisions allowing the United States to link the release of POW's captured in other countries with the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Hanoi comment on the peace agreement has never acknowledged Kissinger's 24 January press conference statement, implying an understanding with the DRV, that American prisoners held in Laos would be returned in Hanoi.

The Hanoi and PRG broadcasts on the 23d also raised the companion issue of the details of the U.S. withdrawal, protesting that one of the U.S. notes on the 22d "did not specify whether or not the remaining U.S. servicemen in the JMC body and in a number of other areas will be completely withdrawn after 28 March." The PRG's complaints were spelled out in the most detail in a 22 March note, released two days later, from the PRG delegation head, Tran Van Tra. Tra criticized the 22 March U.S. note, not only for linking withdrawal to the return of prisoners from throughout Indochina, but also for indicating withdrawal would not begin until a list of those prisoners was received, for setting new dates for the POW return--25 through 28 March, and for stipulating that the U.S. side "will maintain in the South, after 28 March 1973, 1,034 military personnel. . . ." Tra did not break down the 1,034 figure, but it evidently was made up of the 50 military attaches, 159 U.S. Marine embassy guards, and 825 servicemen on the JMC.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 4 -

The specific question of the residual Marine guard was raised in a 24 March VNA account of the JMC session that day which quoted Tra as stating that "the PRG does not accept the U.S. demand to retain 159 American Marines" to guard the embassy. Tra also asserted, according to VNA, that the United States would be allowed to leave "only a small number of military personnel" in four-party JMC teams to look for the missing or killed in action. A note from Tra on the 25th, said to be in response to a U.S. note of the 20th, similarly maintained that the only exceptions to the U.S. withdrawal should be U.S. military attaches and military personnel on the search teams. Continuing dissatisfaction on this point seemed reflected in a 28 March Liberation Radio commentary--two days after the agreement was reached on the final troop withdrawal--which again scored the United States for "arrogantly" declaring that it would retain the Marine guard. The radio commented that "this act is at variance with the agreement and customs of international relations."

While Hanoi media have duly reported the official PRG protests raising questions about residual U.S. forces, official communications from the DRV delegation to the JMC--on the 22d and 25th--did not mention this issue in their comments on the POW question. The details of the U.S. withdrawal were discussed in Hanoi comment, however: A 26 March Hanoi radio commentary derided the U.S. justifications for the 159-man Marine contingent attached to the embassy and accused Washington of plotting to prolong the period of activity of the four-party JMC and of "planning to maintain its 850 military personnel on the JMC in the southern part of our country."

Hanoi and the PRG predictably responded to the 25 March White House announcement that the President had ordered U.S. forces to remain in Vietnam until all U.S. POW's in Indochina are released. The 26 March Hanoi radio commentary routinely portrayed the President's order as evidence that the United States is seeking every pretext to continue its military involvement in South Vietnam. A Liberation Radio commentary on the same day scored the President's "threats" and went on to note that the White House spokesman "hinted to our people that the President is closely watching the POW situation . . . while getting ready for next week's talks with Nguyen Van Thieu." Claiming that this juxtaposition was meant to impart a lesson, the radio commented that "their American excellencies apparently hinted as follows: Beware! If you refuse to return the POW's on the President's terms, he will associate himself even more closely with the Thieu regime."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 5 -

## DRV, PRG CLAIM RESPECT FOR ACCORD, CHARGE ALLIED VIOLATIONS

Hanoi and the PRG continue to accuse the allies of violating the peace agreement while insisting that their side is strictly adhering to the accord. Renewed U.S. charges on the 23d that the communists had established another missile site at Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province, drew a denial from the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 25th. And a PRG spokesman's statement on the 22d, supported by one from the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 23d, condemned alleged Saigon military operations and scored the United States for sending weapons to South Vietnam.

The PRG protest on the 22d and other propaganda have been particularly vehement in decrying ARVN operations to relieve the besieged posts of Tong Le Chan, Tay Ninh Province (designated by the communists to be in Binh Long Province), and Rach Bap, Binh Duong Province. The ARVN is charged with having attacked "liberated areas" in these zones since the beginning of March and to have attempted to cover up its actions by charging the other side with attacks. The communist attacks on Tong Le Chan were in effect acknowledged in a 28 March Liberation Radio commentary which claimed that Saigon troops stationed at the Tong Le Chan base had been conducting missions against surrounding "liberated areas" and that the liberation forces responded with counterblows and "tightened a close siege around the enemy to prevent it from edging out to rob our people and destroy their property." The commentary, like other propaganda, took note of the JMC's 22 March agreement to allow the ARVN to evacuate its wounded troops from Tong Le Chan. However, the radio charged that when the time came for the evacuation on the 24th, Saigon violated the agreement by landing helicopters away from designated sites and bringing in new military supplies. In addition, the radio complained, the base commander refused to meet with the leaders of the communist forces who were to make contact in order to determine a way to end the conflict.

U.S. mine-clearing operations in North Vietnamese waters were again the subject of controversy when Hanoi radio on 24 March reported and scored U.S. Adm. Gayler's statement on the 21st that the United States would deactivate the mines but would not remove them. Further criticism of the operations was broadcast on 26 March, when a Hanoi commentary charged that on the previous day a U.S. helicopter engaged in the effort had capsized a North Vietnamese fishing boat.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 6 -

## USSR CITES ITS SUPPORT FOR DRV, PRG AT PARIS, ATTACKS PEKING

A Moscow commentary by Ukraintsev, broadcast in Mandarin on 22 March, went into unusual detail in contrasting the Soviet and Chinese positions at the Paris conference on Vietnam last month. Listing four major issues discussed at the conference, the commentator claimed that Foreign Minister Gromyko did not shun any of them, thereby clearly showing firm Soviet support for the DRV and the PRG, whereas the Chinese delegation was silent on all four points.\*

Ukraintsev cited Saigon's attempt to "discriminate" against the PRG as the first issue in contention at Paris, and he quoted Gromyko as having assailed "those who are trying to deal blows at the PRG position." The commentator observed correctly that PRC Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei in his 26 February speech had made no attempt to denounce discrimination against the PRG. But Ukraintsev conveniently ignored the fact that in a speech at the 2 March concluding session of the conference, Chi had taken issue with "certain people" who want to deny the PRG's existence.

Chi may in fact have been prompted to make his remarks in support of the PRG on the final day because of his apparent failure to participate to any great extent in the debate on 1 March. Neither Moscow nor Peking media reported that session, but Hanoi's account, by its correspondent in Paris, quoted Gromyko as having backed the PRG's rejection of GVN Foreign Minister Lam's proposal that the conference adopt as an official document a statement that there is only one legal government in South Vietnam. The Hanoi report referred to the Chinese only in the cryptic remark that they, along with the Hungarians and Poles, also opposed the GVN proposal.

Available propaganda supports Soviet commentator Ukraintsev's criticism of the Chinese for remaining silent on the debates regarding supervision of the cease-fire and foreign aid for reconstruction in North Vietnam. Gromyko, as Ukraintsev noted, scored the notion of establishing new control bodies "beyond the scope" of the peace accord and supported Hanoi's contention that aid should be given through bilateral arrangements. Ukraintsev does not appear to be on such good ground, however, in criticizing the Chinese for remaining silent on the competence of the conference to discuss Laos and Cambodia. Available propaganda does not indicate that Gromyko discussed this point either.

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\* Moscow and Peking propagandists had traded mild insults during the conference. Peking, in reporting Gromyko's conference speech, claimed that he had presented no positive views on the issues, and a Moscow Mandarin-language broadcast responded that this was "slander." See the TRENDS of 7 March 1973, pages 7-9.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 7 -

## SIHANOUK REMAINS ABSENT FROM VIEW AS FUNK MARKS ANNIVERSARY

As Prince Sihanouk's conspicuous absence from view extended into a sixth week, the third anniversary on 23 March of his front (FUNK) and insurgent army was marked by hardline pronouncements ruling out an accommodation with the Phnom Penh regime and vowing to carry on the war until complete victory. In the latest (the 42d) of his series of "messages to the Khmer nation," released by NCNA under a Shanghai dateline on 23 March, Sihanouk registered disappointment that his earlier overtures for negotiations with the United States had been unavailing and forcefully reasserted the FUNK's determination to demand a high price for a settlement in Cambodia.

Sihanouk's absence, along with that of his Prime Minister Penn Nouth and "special envoy of the interior" Ieng Sary, suggests that conferences may be in progress among the FUNK leaders, possibly in Indochina, to assess the situation in the wake of the Vietnam and Laos agreements and in face of big-power pressures to achieve a settlement in Cambodia. Penn Nouth has appeared only once during the past several weeks: NCNA reported on 17 March that he had toured a Peking glassware factory that day, but he has been absent from view since then. Ieng Sary's last appearance had been noted in NCNA's account of the arrival of Sihanouk's party in Canton on 7 February following a visit to the DRV. Sihanouk himself was last reported appearing on 16 February, when NCNA announced that he had left Hainan Island for Shanghai by plane that day; there was no report of his arrival in Shanghai.

Last year Sihanouk appeared in Peking for the celebration of the 23 March FUNK anniversary as well as for a major show of support by the PRC on the occasion of the anniversary on 19 March of his arrival in Peking following his overthrow in 1970. The 19 March event was ignored this year, and the highest-level Cambodian representative to appear in Peking on the FUNK anniversary was Sihanouk's foreign minister, who gave a reception on the 23d "in the name" of Sihanouk and Penn Nouth. Making Sihanouk's prolonged absence even more intriguing, Peking this year muted the praise it had lavished on the prince during the anniversary celebrations in 1972 and subordinated his personal role to that of the FUNK itself.

FUNK STATEMENTS      Typifying the FUNK's current hardline approach to the settlement question, Sihanouk's 23 March message harshly denounced "the 'dogs' Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Cheng Heng, Son Ngoc Thanh, Sim Var, Lon Non, Hang Thun Hak, etc." and declared that the FUNK "cannot agree to recognize

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 8 -

or talk and still less to come to a 'compromise' with the gang of Phnom Penh supertraitors." He sought to make it clear that the FUNK would continue the fighting rather than to accept a Vietnam-style cease-fire in which the existing regime would not be dismantled. According to the message, the insurgents "cannot agree to depreciate themselves to the status of 'rebels' or a 'party,' as the Washington government desires."

Referring to his overtures in January and February to hold talks with U.S. representatives, Sihanouk's message expressed regret that Washington would not have contacts with the FUNK and that therefore "there is no alternative but to continue the war." The message put main responsibility on the Nixon Administration for allegedly violating its commitments in the Vietnam agreement by its air operations in Cambodia and its aid to the Phnom Penh regime. In a broader reference that could include the USSR and France as well as the United States, the message concluded by advising unnamed "foreigners, foreign groups, or foreign governments" not to expect the FUNK to modify its intransigent policy.

This tough language has been echoed in comment from the insurgents' radio on the occasion of the FUNK anniversary. A 23 March FUNK radio editorial hailed the insurgents' stance toward the U.S. and Lon Nol governments' "recent schemes about a sham peace, a cease-fire, and 'unity' in Cambodia" while calling for "high vigilance" against the enemy's "cunning, sly, and savage nature" and "plans and schemes" in the "military, political, and diplomatic fields." It called for "even heavier attacks" in an "unretreating and uncompromising resolute struggle" to drive out the United States and destroy the Lon Nol government. Slogans released by the radio on the anniversary called for the Cambodian people to "always break the sham, misleading, and demagogic peace, cease-fire, and concord maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys."

The FUNK's intransigent stance sustains a reversal--first evident in mid-February--of the tendency shown by Sihanouk in the wake of the Vietnam settlement to reappraise the Cambodian situation and to look toward a reduction of hostilities with an eye to a settlement. Beginning in mid-February, a spate of FUNK pronouncements--with those by the three "ministers in the interior" setting the pace--vehemently rejected a compromise settlement or a cease-fire arrangement.\*

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\* See the TRENDS of 31 January 1973, pages 23-25; 7 February, pages 13-15; and 14 March, pages 6-8.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 MARCH 1973

- 9 -

PEKING      Following past practice, Peking marked the FUNK anniversary with a message to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth from Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai as well as a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. Sihanouk's absence would account for the failure of Chou, who headed strong leadership turnouts for the celebrations last March, to appear this time. Chou's deputy, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, led the Chinese present at the 23 March Peking reception, at which Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei spoke.

This year the Chinese failed to repeat their 1972 encomium hailing Sihanouk as "the closest friend of the Chinese people" and muffled his personal role in the Cambodian struggle. And where the editorial last year congratulated Sihanouk, Penn Nouth, the FUNK, the RGNU, and the insurgent armed forces, in that order, this year it hailed the FUNK "with head of state Samdech Norodom Sihanouk as chairman" and the RGNU with Penn Nouth as prime minister and Khieu Samphan as deputy prime minister. The addition of Khieu Samphan this year reflects the prominent status in recent weeks of the in-country ministers and comports with the diminished standing accorded Sihanouk.

Consistent with its approach to the Vietnam question, Peking has viewed the Cambodian issue as basically a matter of big-power--specifically U.S.--disengagement. Chinese comment on the anniversary this year muted last year's references to the Cambodian "people's war," instead using the less provocative term "struggle" and sidestepping calls for the insurgents to defeat the United States and the Lon Nol government by force of arms. Peking also failed to repeat last year's criticism of "international forces" for attempting to create a Khmer third force and largely avoided the question of a compromise settlement. On the other hand, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial flatly stated that "the key" to a settlement is an end to U.S. air attacks and military aid to Lon Nol in order for the Cambodians to settle their own affairs. The leaders' message, the editorial, and Chi's speech all duly affirmed support for Sihanouk's March 1970 five-point declaration, though there was no effort to define it as the sole basis for a settlement.

Though there were no expressly anti-Soviet references, Peking used the anniversary to promote its theme of Asian unity, implicitly excluding the Soviets. Drawing on Mao's remark to Mme. Binh in late December that the peoples of China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Korea are all of the same family, the Tung-Chou message concluded by declaring that the Chinese and Cambodian peoples

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 MARCH 1973

- 10 -

"are of the same family." Similarly, NCNA's account of the 23 March Peking reception highlighted the presence of DRV, PRG, and DPRK envoys and invoked "the great friendship and revolutionary unity of the peoples of Cambodia, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Korea."

HANOI, PRG      The Vietnamese communists observed the anniversary along the lines of past years, including the observance of a "week of solidarity" with the Cambodian people, leaders' messages, editorials, and a reception hosted by the RGNU ambassador in Hanoi which was attended by Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap and addressed by Nguyen Duy Trinh. There was no repetition of last year's "grand meeting" in Hanoi addressed by Giap and others or of a similar session held in the "liberated zone" in the South; but last year's celebration had been unique, neither type of meeting having been reported in 1971.

Vietnamese comment this year routinely praised the victories of the Cambodian people and reaffirmed the solidarity of the Indochinese peoples in accord with the declaration of the 1970 Indochina summit. Along stock lines, Sihanouk was hailed as the representative of the "legality, authenticity, and continuity of the Cambodian state" and the RGNU as "the sole legal and legitimate government of the Cambodian people." The NHAN DAN editorial cited DRV statements during Sihanouk's 30 January-7 February visit to Hanoi to underline continuing Vietnamese support, and the DRV leaders' message reaffirmed that the Vietnamese will continue to "wholeheartedly and unswervingly support and assist" the FUNK's struggle.

Vietnamese spokesmen once again used the anniversary to denounce U.S. actions throughout Indochina, with Trinh getting in a jab at alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the Paris agreement and the DRV leaders' message sharply condemning U.S. "extermination bombing" in Cambodia. However, the Vietnamese softpedaled last year's harsh charges against the United States for being a "stubborn, bellicose, and perfidious foe" and muted criticism of the Nixon Doctrine while offering only stock attacks against "Khmerization."

On the sensitive settlement question, the Vietnamese, like the Chinese, avoided outright support for Sihanouk's recent hardline statements while pledging general backing for his March 1970 five points as well as for RGNU statements of late January and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 11 -

February this year that had notably failed to press the intransigent line of opposition to negotiations or a cease-fire. Focusing on the routine demand that the United States end its intervention so as to allow the Cambodians to settle their own problems without foreign interference, the Vietnamese sidestepped the issue of a political accommodation among the Cambodian parties. While there was ample criticism of the Lon Nol regime as a "U.S. tool" now in its "death throes," the Vietnamese failed to repeat their calls last year for Lon Nol's "overthrow."

MOSCOW The Soviets gave the FUNK anniversary scant coverage, but they made clear their desire for a settlement in Cambodia to follow on the Vietnam and Laos agreements. Giving the occasion less publicity than last year, Moscow marked the anniversary with a PRAVDA article buried on page five and a few foreign-language radio commentaries, but there was no repeat of last year's TASS report of a Moscow "public meeting" attended by Asian diplomats. Consistent with normal practice and with Moscow's failure to recognize Sihanouk's government, Soviet comment failed to mention either Sihanouk or the RGNU and refrained from criticizing the Lon Nol government by name.

PRAVDA stressed that the "turn of events in Indochina toward peace and a political settlement" makes the Cambodian question "particularly acute" now that agreements have been reached on Vietnam and Laos. PRAVDA made a point of citing the FUNK's assessment of the Vietnam agreement as auguring well for the prospects of peace in Cambodia, but the Soviets could hardly have been cheered by the reversion to a hard line reflected in subsequent FUNK pronouncements. Trying to put the best possible face on Moscow's role in Cambodia at a time of FUNK intransigence, PRAVDA asserted that the "movement of the patriotic forces" in Cambodia has always been backed by the Soviet Union. The article closed, as it began, with a plea for a settlement in Cambodia that will match those in Vietnam and Laos.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 MARCH 1973

- 12 -

## LAO COMMUNIST PARTY: DOCUMENTS CARRIED ON CLANDESTINE CIRCUIT

On 20 March a clandestine Pathet Lao point-to-point radioteletype circuit\* carried a Lao People's (Communist) Party (LPP) appeal marking the anniversary of the founding of the party, along with a service message directing that it be broadcast on Pathet Lao radio dictation-speed programs. Despite the instructions, the appeal has not been heard on any monitored Pathet Lao programs, sustaining a long-standing pattern of silence about the Lao communist party in the regular Pathet Lao media. The appeal, dated 22 March, was issued by the secretary general of the Central Committee of the LPP "to party committees at all levels and party members." The secretary general was identified as Viengsay, which appears to be an alias used by LPP Secretary General Kaysone Phomvihane.

The appeal followed the pattern of a similar anniversary appeal, carried in the same point-to-point circuit last year, denouncing the activities of the "U.S. imperialists and their lackeys" in Laos and adjuring party members to study the decisions of the second LPP congress, apparently held in early 1972. The appeal hailed the signing of the 21 February agreement as a great victory but warned that the "ultrareactionaries" would "continue to implement their pacification plan in their temporarily controlled areas, create unrest, sabotage the liberated zone, and obstruct the implementation of the agreement." Party members were urged "to force the U.S. imperialists to terminate their military involvement in Laos."

The service message accompanying the appeal contained the following directions: "The original copy of this appeal should be read on dictation-speed programs. This original copy must not be changed. The announcer must be reminded of this restriction." The instruction not to change the text may have been included to ensure that no announcer would inadvertently change the name of the party as it was rendered in the appeal: Instead of referring to the party as the Lao People's Revolutionary Party or the Lao Revolutionary Party, as had been the practice in the past, the party was identified in the appeal simply as the Lao Party--a vague title which may reflect an LPP effort to obscure its image in the fluid period following the signing of the 21 February agreement.

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\* The point-to-point circuit carries traffic between stations in northeast Laos and in Hanoi and an unidentified station, possibly associated with the Pathet Lao radio.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 13 -

On 16 March, the same point-to-point circuit had carried messages from Secretary General Kaysone to CPSU chief Brezhnev and to the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Central Committee. The messages extended thanks to the recipients for their greetings to the LPP on the signing of the 21 February agreement in Vientiane; the original greetings have not been monitored from any source. Kaysone's message of thanks to the VWP frankly admitted that the "enormous victory" of the "patriotic forces and people of Laos" could not have been achieved without "support from the fraternal Vietnamese party, government, and people, who have also contributed their lives and blood to the Lao people's revolutionary cause." His message to Brezhnev expressed thanks to the CPSU "for its assistance" and extended recognition to the Soviet Union as the leader of "the various fraternal socialist countries."

**BACKGROUND** Rare allusions to the existence of the LPP have been carried in Pathet Lao news media. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the proclamation of Laos' independence the PATHET LAO NEWS AGENCY in 1970 transmitted a lengthy article by Kaysone reviewing the history of the struggle of the "genuine revolutionary party," but the article did not mention the party's official name.\* While attending the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971 as an NLHS delegate, Kaysone hinted in his speech at the role of the LPP by noting that the Lao people's struggle was being carried on "under the correct leadership of the vanguard party."\*\*

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\* See the 7 October 1970 TRENDS, pages 11-12.

\*\* See the 7 April 1971 TRENDS, page 8.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI TRENDS

28 MARCH 1973

- 14 -

## SALT

## RED STAR WARNS THAT TRIDENT CONTRADICTS SPIRIT OF SALT I

In the most authoritative criticism of U.S. defense programs to be carried in Soviet media since the start of SALT TWO, Georgiy Svyatov in the 23 March RED STAR asserted that U.S. plans for accelerating construction of submarine strategic weapons systems were incompatible with the spirit of the initial SALT agreements. Showing particular concern about the U.S. Trident system, Svyatov--a retired Navy captain and USA Institute specialist on U.S. strategy--claimed that appropriations for Trident in the FY-1973 budget are seven times what they were in FY-1972. He did not refer to Trident funds in the recently released draft budget for FY-1974. He dismissed as "far-fetched" the argument that accelerated construction of submarine missile systems would strengthen the U.S. position in negotiations with Moscow, claiming that the path toward improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations should be sought not through building up armaments but through curbing the arms race--in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects.

The RED STAR article comes against a background of Soviet media discussion of what is described as an increasing U.S. interest in developing the naval component of its strategic forces. Like an earlier article by the same author and a collaborator, Andrey Kokoshin, in the March 1973 MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, it said that increased reliance on Trident and sea-based systems was in part a response to U.S. concern about the survivability of land-based systems. The earlier article had explained the source of this concern as the view, imputed to American specialists, that

land-based strategic missile forces are becoming more and more vulnerable. At the same time, underwater missiles, which have nearly the same characteristics as the land-based missile systems (Minuteman III)--that is, sufficient range, multiple warheads, increased accuracy, and so forth--also have the advantage of secrecy of operation.

Svyatov had registered the same warning about the implications of Trident for the spirit of the 1972 SALT agreements--in almost identical words--in two articles published after the summit last year. One article, analyzing the principle of equal security which Svyatov saw at the basis of the SALT agreements, was

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 15 -

published in the 28 July 1972 RED STAR; the other was an earlier article on the U.S. Navy in the September 1972 USA. But the 23 March RED STAR article is the first in the central press to register such concern since negotiations resumed in November. Svyatov mentioned the second phase of SALT only indirectly, in noting that further progress in curbing the arms race would accord with "the spirit of the times."

The article also illustrates the continuing central press policy of avoiding direct comment on MIRV. Though the March Svyatov and Kokoshin article and other specialized journal articles have occasionally discussed the MIRV program for both land- and sea-based missiles, Svyatov in RED STAR skirted the issue, noting only that full deployment of Poseidon would give the United States 496 sea-based missiles and 5,000-6,000 warheads.

Moscow has also recently shown sensitivity to continued U.S. study of ABM systems since the agreements signed last May. The March 1973 Svyatov and Kokoshin article warned that a sea-based ABM system--in which they said the U.S. military was interested--would be in direct contravention of the SALT accords. An article in the most recent (March) issue of USA by A.N. Bandura on military uses of lasers in the United States cited three applications in ABM components which, he said, were under study.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 16 -

## USSR - IRAQ

## SADDAM HUSAYN, KOSYGIN HOLD "COMRADELY" TALKS IN MOSCOW

In the latest of the high-level Soviet-Iraqi talks over the past year, Saddam Husayn, deputy secretary general of the Ba'th Party Regional Command and deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council, paid a "friendly visit" to Moscow on 21-24 March. Saddam Husayn's last visit, in February 1972, was followed by Kosygin's visit to Iraq, a visit highlighted by the signing on 9 April of the Soviet-Iraqi friendship and cooperation treaty.\*

Speaking at a Kremlin luncheon for the Iraqi delegation on the 22d, Kosygin noted that the first anniversary of "this remarkable event," the signing of the friendship and cooperation treaty, would soon be celebrated. Saddam Husayn, speaking in reply, said "we shall be glad to have you with us in Baghdad" to celebrate the anniversary and invited "Brezhnev, the other Soviet leaders and yourself" to Iraq for the occasion. While the communique makes no mention of acceptance of the invitation by the Soviet leaders, this does not necessarily rule out the sending of a high-level Soviet delegation for the anniversary ceremonies. Invitations to Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin had been extended and accepted, for "dates to be fixed later," in the communiqués on Saddam Husayn's visit last February and that of President al-Bakr to Moscow last September.

In his luncheon speech, Kosygin also said that the Soviets were "highly pleased" with the "exchange of opinion" on Soviet-Iraqi cooperation, and he welcomed the "identity and coincidence" of the two countries' views on a wide range of international questions. Thanks to this convergence of "views and purposes," he added, the USSR and Iraq "come out as comrades-in-arms" in their anti-imperialist struggle.

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\* Kosygin's visit was for the stated purpose of attending the commissioning of the ar-Rumaylah oilfield. Immediately after Baghdad's 1 June nationalization of Iraq Petroleum Company assets in Iraq, Foreign Minister al-Baqi arrived in Moscow, and President al-Bakr paid his first visit to the USSR last September.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 17 -

The Iraqi delegation had talks with Kosygin on the 22d in an atmosphere characterized by TASS as "cordial and comradely," and Saddam Husayn was received by Brezhnev the next day for a talk held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere." (His meeting with Brezhnev last February had been described as "frank and friendly.") The discussion dealt with bilateral relations, including party relations, as well as an "exchange of views" on the Middle East situation.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE      Other than a brief reference to Indochina, the Middle East was the only international topic covered in the communique. As in the February and September communiqués last year, the Middle East passage in the current document routinely declared that a just peace cannot be established without the liberation of all occupied Arab lands and insuring the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people. The sides again underscored the importance of "cohesion and joint action" by the Arab states in the anti-imperialist struggle. As for bilateral relations, the communique touched on Iraq's oil nationalization, expressed the sides' satisfaction with CPSU-Ba'th contacts, and assessed the visit as an important contribution to the development of Soviet-Iraqi "friendly relations" based on the "firm foundation" of the treaty. The joint document, however, is most notable for its avoidance of a number of issues:

+ The communique makes no mention of Iraq's "progressive achievements" in the domestic field, particularly in connection with the "national progressive forces." Moscow has shown impatience with Baghdad for its continuing inability or disinclination to implement the draft National Action Charter of November 1971 and establish a national front of the country's "progressive forces," including the Iraqi Communist Party and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. In this vein Kosygin in his luncheon speech on the 22d declared that "the consolidation of the national front of the progressive forces of Iraq is of great importance" for Iraq's successful advance. During Saddam Husayn's visit a year ago, Kosygin had cited efforts by the Ba'th and "other progressive parties and organizations" to set up such a national front, which he had said would facilitate Iraqi advancement "along the path of progressive socio-economic reforms." In last September's communique, President al-Bakr was said to have acquainted the Soviet side with the "solidarity" of these forces, but there was no corresponding statement of approval or even acknowledgment from the Soviets.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 18 -

+ There is also no reference to the perennial Kurdish question, although in the September 1972 communique the Soviet side had expressed satisfaction with the steps taken toward settlement of this issue. And in February 1972 Kosygin had looked toward "further implementation" of the 11 March 1970 Iraqi statement on a "peaceful democratic settlement" of the Kurdish problem. Saddam Husayn was reported by TASS on 20 March as having told a student seminar in Baghdad that there were "still difficulties" in solving the Kurdish problem but that "we must adhere to the provisions" of the March 1970 settlement.

Former PRAVDA Middle East specialist Yevgeniy Primakov, who visited Iraq early this month, observed in a PRAVDA article broadcast by Moscow in Arabic on the 10th that there were still "elements who are indifferent" to the "creation of circumstances allowing a permanent solution" to the Kurdish question. He included among these elements "persons who have ties with foreign circles, those who profited from the war in northern Iraq, and reactionaries trying to exploit Kurdish-Arab contradictions." Recounting his conversations with Arabs in Baghdad and Kurds in the north, Primakov noted that "some talked about going slow" in implementing some articles of the agreement, and "I felt there was a trend to blame the other side."

+ There is no indication that military topics were on the agenda during the visit, but Iraqi Foreign Minister al-Baqi, in an interview with the Beirut AN-NAHAR reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 27th, said "the question of supplying Iraq with Soviet arms was discussed" in Moscow. Al-Baqi, a member of Saddam Husayn's delegation, added that "Russia is giving us the arms we need," and said that "arms shipments were increased following our friendship agreement" with the USSR. Last September's communique had recorded Soviet-Iraqi agreement on "concrete measures to further strengthen the defensive capacity" of Iraq.

+ The communique made no reference to the Persian Gulf, although both the February and September communiqués last year supported the struggle of the people of the gulf against "imperialist plots" and affirmed that the people of the gulf should determine their own destiny. The latter point was made in the communique on Kosygin's just-concluded visit to Iran, which preceded Saddam Husayn's arrival in Moscow by less than a week. With respect to gulf affairs, Moscow leaned to Iraq's side in its minimal reporting of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border incident on

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 19 -

20 March. Ignoring Kuwait's charge that Iraqi troops attacked and occupied a Kuwaiti police post, TASS on the 21st merely cited Baghdad's version that an Iraqi frontier post had been attacked by Kuwait, and reported from Cairo on Arab offers to mediate between the two countries.

+ Unlike the recent Soviet-Iranian communique, in which the sides declared their "intention" to help in creating an Asian collective security system, the Soviet-Iraqi communique made no reference to this idea. However, Kosygin, in his 22 March luncheon speech, did assert that the Soviet and Iraqi peoples could take pride in the fact that in strengthening the bonds of Soviet-Iraqi friendship "they also strengthen the basis of peace in Asia" and throughout the world. In one of the infrequent references to the Middle East in connection with this proposal, an Itskov commentary broadcast in Japanese on 22 February pointed out, in the course of promoting an Asian security system, that the Soviet treaties with India, Egypt, and Iraq have made a "satisfactory contribution to the relaxation of tension and the stabilization of the situation in Asia."

IPC NATIONALIZATION      The communique noted that Saddam Husayn informed the Soviet side about Iraq's achievements in creating its national oil industry and establishing sovereignty over its mineral wealth, and about the importance of the 1 March agreement this year with the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) which "consolidated Iraq's victory in nationalization and marketing of its oil." In turn, the Soviets expressed support for these steps and confirmed readiness to continue developing cooperation with Iraq, "specifically in the field of petroleum." Saddam Husayn, in his 22 March speech, expressed appreciation of "honest" Soviet aid and support to Iraq's oil battle. He had been reported by TASS on the 20th as saying at a meeting in Baghdad that the USSR gave Iraq "real assistance" after the nationalization; "the first tanker in which we shipped the first tons

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 20 -

of oil after nationalization was a Soviet tanker," and the USSR and other socialist countries signed contracts on purchasing nationalized oil.\*

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\* Libya's al-Qadhdhafi, in a speech reported by Tripoli radio on 7 March, had an entirely different view of Soviet aid to countries which nationalized "capitalist and monopolist companies." After Libya nationalized British Petroleum, he said, "Russia bought a quantity as a matter of courtesy lest we say Russia did not buy the nationalized oil." He complained that the USSR and Bulgaria each bought a "small quantity" of oil from Libya; the "great Soviet Union" can buy more than that, he said, but "it wants to fight us too," and it took "a negative attitude similar to Britain's."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 21 -

## C U B A - U . S . - U S S R

### MOSCOW URGES U.S. TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH CUBA

In the wake of last month's U.S.-Cuban hijacking agreement, Moscow has apparently concluded that the time is propitious for urging a change in U.S. policy toward the Castro regime.\* Citing growing sentiment in the United States for a rapprochement with Cuba, two recent articles in the Soviet press argued that continuation of the policy of isolating Cuba would only increase U.S. "isolation" in the hemisphere. Implicit in this argument is the notion that U.S. intransigence is the only stumbling block to a detente. No mention is made of conditions set by Havana and Washington for an improvement in relations between the two countries.\*\*

Moscow has long given favorable publicity to statements by U.S. congressmen and editorials in the U.S. press urging a revision of U.S. policy toward Cuba and has repeatedly cited the renewal of ties between Cuba and other Latin American states as evidence of the "bankruptcy" of U.S. policy. However, comment supporting a restoration of U.S.-Cuban relations has been infrequent. IZVESTIYA and RED STAR, the papers that carried the articles on the 15th and 21st, respectively, both published a 23 March TASS dispatch reporting a Harris public opinion poll in which a majority of Americans was found favoring a renewal of relations with Cuba.

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\* For a discussion of initial Soviet reaction to the hijacking agreement, see the TRENDS of 22 February 1973, page 25.

\*\* Cuban conditions for initiating talks on improving U.S.-Cuban relations have fluctuated. Radio Havana on 25 March quoted Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa as telling a Panamanian radio station that as prerequisites for initiating such a dialog the United States must abandon its role of "gendarme for reactionaries and imperialism in Latin America," unconditionally lift the economic "blockade" of Cuba, and dismantle Guantanamo. In his last public statement on the matter in December, Castro took a softer line, stipulating only the termination of the economic "blockade." For an analysis of Castro's comments, see the TRENDS of 20 December 1972, pages 24-25.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 22 -

The IZVESTIYA article, "The Return of the Boomerang" by K. Khachaturov, argued that the failure of the United States to overturn the Castro regime by means of an economic and political "blockade" had caused "an agonizing reappraisal" of U.S. policy by "an influential section of the U.S. ruling circles." Khachaturov attributed the change in attitude to such factors as the shift in the international "correlation of forces" in favor of the socialist camp, "the irreversibility" of socialism in Cuba, and the "important anti-imperialist changes" that have occurred in Latin America in recent years. He claimed that Washington's actions against Havana were "doomed to failure" by the support provided by the socialist countries, "primarily the Soviet Union," and that "the lifting of the economic and political blockade of Cuba has long been a generally acknowledged fact."

Referring to the "growing moral-political isolation of U.S. imperialism" in Latin America, Khachaturov cited a statement by Senator Edward Kennedy that "the policy aimed at isolating Cuba can be used just as effectively to isolate the United States" and observed that "the boomerang is returning." "Today as never before," he concluded, the interests of the United States "urgently" require that "the anti-Cuban policy--which has failed in all its manifestations--be ended."

Much the same arguments were made in the RED STAR article, entitled "The Failure of the Policy of Isolation" and signed by V. Berezin. After observing that "sensible" U.S. politicians were coming to realize that Washington cannot prevent Latin American states from normalizing relations with the Castro regime, the article alleged that Washington rather than Havana was "falling into ever greater isolation" in the hemisphere. Continuation of U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba, Berezin concluded, would only lead to "unpleasant consequences for U.S. prestige in the Western Hemisphere."

Although the two articles shed little light on Soviet motivations in urging a revision of U.S. policy towards Cuba, there are some indications pointing to Moscow's desire to avoid a major confrontation with the United States over Cuba. This was obliquely suggested by Khachaturov, who opened his article by noting that the Vietnam settlement provides "new opportunities" for intensifying detente and consolidating peace and paves the way to a peaceful and just resolution of other contentious problems." One such "situation of conflict," he said, is a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 23 -

consequence of U.S. "Imperialist policy" toward Cuba. Khachaturov also noted that the abandonment of Washington's hostility toward Havana "corresponds to the interests of peace in the Western Hemisphere and throughout the world."

Clues to Moscow's thinking on the subject appear in a recent work entitled "International Conflicts," produced by one of the USSR's prestigious academic think-tanks. The book, signed to press in August 1972, stressed the dangers of local conflicts escalating into confrontations between nuclear powers. The existence of such local conflicts and the latent dangers of their escalation, it was argued, introduce an "uncontrollable element" into international conflicts and crises. Moreover, the threat to international stability posed by the so-called "uncontrollable element" was said to be "gradually increasing."

Although the book predictably defined the "uncontrollable element" in international conflicts solely in terms of the behavior of the smaller capitalist states, it is conceivable that Moscow views Cuba in this same light. Moscow may reason that as long as Washington's relations with Havana remain frigid, the situation remains fraught with danger. Moscow's sensitivity on this matter was displayed in its treatment of Castro's May Day speech last year. TASS, in summarizing the speech, reported Castro's warning of reprisals against the Guantanamo naval base in the event of the sinking of Cuban warships by the U.S. Navy, but Moscow carefully avoided comment on the matter.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 MARCH 1973

- 24 -

## EUROPE FORCE CUTS

## SOVIET BLOC STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF EQUAL SECURITY IN TALKS

While Soviet bloc comment on the current force reduction talks in Vienna has been generally low-keyed and non-committal as to the outcome of the negotiations, some of Moscow's East European allies have begun to elaborate a more accusatory line in explaining the slow progress of the talks. The main feature of this line is the charge that NATO is attempting to gain a unilateral advantage over the Warsaw Pact by refusing to accept the principle of equal security as a basis for the negotiations. This charge has been advanced most recently in speeches by Polish Premier Jaroszewicz on the 16th and by Hungarian Premier Fock on the 21st. In these speeches and in lower level comment the charge is specifically related to alleged Western efforts to gerrymander the membership of the conference in such a way as to exclude important elements of Western forces from the purview of an eventual agreement.

Polish Vice Foreign Minister Bisztyga, in a speech on the 12th outlining Poland's views on general disarmament issues, made an obvious reference to NATO's refusal to pair Italy with Hungary for equal participation in the talks in his charge that NATO was trying to weaken the Pact's "southern flank." The Polish army paper, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, on the 2nd, had described the pairing idea as a "compromise proposal" designed to give "equal status" to Hungary and Italy.

The Bulgarian party paper RABOTNICHESKO DELO on the 25th revealed some of the more serious concerns underlying the Soviet bloc's procedural maneuvering over the issue of membership in the conference. The author, Dino Kyosev, drew attention for the first time since the current Vienna talks opened to the question of Spain, where, he said, "the United States maintains large military strategic bases and large numbers of military personnel, [and which] is also excluded from the negotiations and therefore from any eventual decisions." Kyosev also pointed out that because NATO had rejected the Soviet proposal that "all countries in Europe should participate in the negotiations and decisions . . . , France is not participating in the Vienna meeting, being against

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PHIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 25 -

negotiations between the alliances as such." Finally he noted that the scope of the conference as favored by the West would exclude NATO and U.S. strategic bases in the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey.\*

VIENNA-HELSINKI LINK      Soviet and East European comment continues to stress the theme that the Helsinki talks on the European security conference and the subsequent conference itself must set the political base and atmosphere for the future force reduction negotiations. Soviet bloc comment is quick to attack, however, the notion that NATO countries might stall progress at Helsinki in order to accelerate developments at Vienna. In a unique statement by a Soviet bloc official that seems to admit what it professes to deny--namely that the Soviet bloc would adjust its policy at Vienna to affect the timetable at the Helsinki talks--Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chmoupek in a dinner speech in Belgrade on the 5th declared that Prague would do everything possible to achieve "within a reasonable time" an agreement on procedural questions and tasks in order to create preconditions for meritorious negotiations on the problem of force reductions.

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\* In a discussion of U.S. naval strategic systems in the March issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, two USA Institute specialists, Georgiy Svyatov and Andrey Kokoshin, observed that, according to American experts, when the United States begins to deploy its Trident missile system in the late seventies there will be less need for bases such as those at Rota (Spain) and Holy Loch (Scotland). They cited two reasons for this possibility: the increased range of the Trident missile compared with the Polaris and Poseidon, and the increased "political" cost of maintaining these bases in countries where they are opposed by "antiwar forces." See the SALT section of this TRENDS and the 21 March TRENDS, page 7-8, for further discussion of the article.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

28 MARCH 1973

- 26 -

China

## LEADERS REAPPEAR AFTER PERIOD OF ABSENCE FROM VIEW

A high-level conference that may have accounted for the absence from view of most Chinese Politburo members for 10 days in mid-March was over by about the 22d, judging by the spate of leaders' appearances that began on that date. The last significant turnout had been on 12 March when three Politburo members and an alternate member met a visiting Romanian cultural delegation in Peking. Apart from two appearances on the 14th by Li Hsien-nien, who as Chou En-lai's deputy is often active when other leaders are absent, none of the Politburo members made an appearance until Yao Wen-yuan saw the Romanian delegation in Peking on the 22d after it had made a tour of the provinces. Chou, who had last appeared on 8 March, surfaced again on the 25th, as expected, to welcome the Cameroon president. Chou has resumed his normal active pace, and Mao received the Cameroon leader on the 26th.

Having met with the Romanian delegation on 22 March, Yao saw the group off for home on the next day. On the 25th Chang Chun-chiao met with New Zealand communist leader Wilcox. Li Hsien-nien was typically active during this period of resumed appearances. Thus, among the Peking-based Politburo full members active since the Lin Biao purge, only Chiang Ching and Yeh Chien-ying have not made appearances since the 12th. On that day Yeh had been ranked ahead of Chiang, a reversal of their normal order that had only one precedent.\*

## MASS ORGANIZATIONS REBUILT: SHANGHAI TO FORM TRADE UNION

The rebuilding of mass organizations destroyed in the cultural revolution, already far advanced in the case of the YCL, is also progressing with trade unions and women's organizations. A 28 March broadcast from Shanghai indicates that, having been the first to elect a new YCL committee, Shanghai will be the first provincial-level unit to reorganize its trade unions on a formal basis. The broadcast reported that the municipal CCP committee recently held a preparatory meeting for convening the fifth Shanghai municipal workers congress, which "will elect the fifth committee of the Shanghai municipal federation of trade unions." No date was set for the congress, but the report indicated that it would be held soon, asserting that conditions "are now ripe" after more than a year of preparation.

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\* See the TRENDS of 21 March 1973, pages 24-25.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI TRENDS

28 MARCH 1973

- 27 -

Besides electing a new trade union committee, the congress will review the programs of the workers movement in Shanghai and "discuss the tasks" of the trade unions. While the broadcast did not clarify whether the trade union committee elected by the workers congress would function as a standing committee for the workers congress, thus in effect becoming the operational power in the workers movement, it left no doubt that the real guidance would come from the party. The unions are to act as an "assistant" to the party in carrying out Mao's line.

The broadcast's praise for Shanghai workers' cultural revolution behavior suggests that the current labor hierarchy in the city will be basically retained. The broadcast did not, however, mention the "workers revolutionary rebel general headquarters," cited in broadcasts as late as 1971 and led by Shanghai party secretaries Wang Hung-wen and Wang Hsiu-chen. The broadcast resurrected some of the cultural revolution charges aimed at Liu Shao-chi but, updating the charges to include Lin Biao as a target, accused "swindlers like Liu" of economism and of having "negated party leadership over the work of the trade unions."

The resurrection of mass organizations had been authoritatively sanctioned in the New Year's joint editorial, which stated that "the trade unions, the Communist Youth League, and the Red Guard, Little Red Soldier, poor and lower-middle peasant and women's organizations should be consolidated step by step." The YCL has led in the reorganization with two provincial committees already established and a number of others scheduled to be elected by the 4 May Youth Day. Women's organizations have also shown signs of rebuilding, though no provincial-level congresses have been called. A Shantung broadcast on 18 March reported a regional-level women's federation congress held from 8-15 March, and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 8 March marking International Women's Day stated that "women's organizations at various levels should be consolidated and their work improved so that they can act as capable assistants to party committees in carrying out women's work and as militant organizations in mobilizing the masses of women." Unlike the other mass organizations, a central structure for the women's organization survived the cultural revolution, though it has not been publicly active. Tsai Chang and Teng Ying-chao were identified as president and vice president of the organization at the funeral of another vice president last April, and members of the federation were also identified as attending the funeral of Ho Hsiang-chien in September.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 28 -

## U S S R

### MOSCOW'S PURGE OF ARMENIAN LEADERSHIP GAINS MOMENTUM

For the second time in five months a Moscow cadre official has been dispatched to Armenia to shake up the republic leadership, and the roster of ousted leaders now includes the premier, second secretary, agriculture secretary, and KGB chief. Although no public charges against the ousted officials nor exposures of shortcomings have been made, the situation remains precarious since First Secretary Kochinyan was not allowed to conduct the purges himself and Russians have replaced Armenians in two of the most sensitive posts in the republic--those of KGB chief and of Central Committee second secretary or republic cadre chief.

A 22 March Armenian Central Committee plenum on "an organizational question" replaced Second Secretary G. A. Ter-Gazaryants, who was transferred to diplomatic work, with a Russian, P. P. Anisimov, deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee party organizational work section and a former Leningrad city party secretary. Anisimov was installed by his superior, N. A. Petrovichev, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee cadre section. Ter-Gazaryants last appeared at a 3 March funeral and on 9 March was awarded an Order of the Labor Red Banner on his 50th birthday.

A similar Armenian Central Committee "organizational" plenum on 23 November, supervised by deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee cadre section B. N. Moralev, had removed Premier B. A. Muradyan and Secretary for agriculture M. S. Melkonyan.\* Two days earlier, the longtime Armenian KGB chief G. A. Badamyants had been replaced by a Russian, A. P. Ragozin.

These shakeups clearly reflect Moscow's loss of confidence in the Armenian leadership. This is particularly noteworthy since the Armenians have long been trusted to manage their own affairs: while most republics have normally had Russians in the post of second secretary, in Armenia the post has been occupied by Armenians for at least three decades. First Secretary Kochinyan's position appears to be in jeopardy since he has had close ties

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\* For background, see the TRENDS of 29 November 1972, pages 29-30.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
28 MARCH 1973

- 29 -

with all the ousted officials and apparently played no role in their removal. He notably failed to address either plenum. Apart from Kochinyan, the only top Armenian leaders to retain their posts are Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman N. Kh. Arutyunyan and Secretary for Ideology E. G. Khachatryan.

#### KAZAKH OBLAST BORDERS REARRANGED FOR ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

Following recent journal articles on the need to rearrange territorial boundaries in order to facilitate economic development, Moscow has authorized the creation of two new Kazakh oblasts. Public discussion of the changes has stressed the economic rationale for the reorganization. The southern petroleum-rich section of Guryev oblast has been separated from the northern agricultural area to form Mangyslak oblast, while the southern metallurgical and mining area of Karaganda oblast has been separated from the coal-oriented north to form Dzhezkazgan oblast. The changes were first announced in a 7 March speech by Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev revealing that the CPSU Central Committee had approved the republic's proposal to create the new oblasts.

The idea of revising regional borders to improve economic planning and development had been raised by economic geographer M. M. Palamarchuk in the October KOMMUNIST UKRAINY, by USSR Gosplan officials V. Kistanov and V. Kostennikov in the December PLANNED ECONOMY, and by Kistanov in the December QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS.

CONFIDENTIAL